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risk in many different contexts (including 
cultural, geographical and political), where 
flexibility through use of cost–benefit 
analyses is a standard practice. This process 
would benefit the IPCC WGII by widening 
the pool of research and practical solutions 
covered, making the reviews more relevant 
to decision-makers and by incorporation of 
more transparent language and terminology 
(such as climate change resilience) in 
future assessments.
The IPCC process provides the most 
compelling account of evidence about climate 
science through the working group reports 
and yet, the forthcoming Synthesis Report 
would benefit significantly from incorporation 
of practitioner experience of climate 
solutions implementation. Co-production 
of knowledge, across academic, political and 
practitioner communities, would frame, 
structure and deliver climate action. Such a 
process will ensure that future IPCC reports 
are more up-to-date, robust and complete 
in their analysis and that the climate change 
resilience solutions proposed incorporate the 
most practically viable research. ❐
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Betting on negative emissions
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Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage could be used to remove carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. However, its credibility as a climate change mitigation option is unproven and its 
widespread deployment in climate stabilization scenarios might become a dangerous distraction.
Future warming will depend strongly on the cumulative CO2 emissions released through to the end of this 
century1,2. A finite quota of cumulative CO2 
emissions, no more than 1,200 Gt CO2, 
is needed from 2015 onwards to stabilize 
climate below a global average of 2 °C above 
pre-industrial conditions by 2100 with a 
likelihood of 66%. This corresponds to 
about 30 years at current emissions levels3. 
However, during the past decade, emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion and cement 
production have increased substantially to 
36.1 ± 1.8 Gt CO2 yr−1 in 2013 (refs 4,5), 
projected to reach 37.0 ± 1.8 Gt CO2 yr−1 
in 2014 (ref. 3), 65% above their 1990 level. 
Staying within the 2 °C limit in a cost-
effective way will require strong mitigation 
action across all sectors, with greater effort 
needed the longer mitigation is delayed.
Actions that could stabilize climate as 
desired include the deliberate removal 
of CO2 from the atmosphere by human 
intervention — called here ‘negative 
emissions’. Along with afforestation, the 
production of sustainable bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is 
explicitly being put forth as an important 
mitigation option by the majority of 
integrated assessment model (IAM) 
scenarios aimed at keeping warming 
below 2 °C in the IPCC’s fifth assessment 
report (AR5)6. Indeed, in these scenarios, 
IAMs often foresee absorption of CO2 via 
BECCS up to (and in some cases exceeding) 
1,000 Gt CO2 over the course of the 
century7, effectively doubling the available 
carbon quota.
BECCS is the negative emissions 
technology most widely selected by IAMs to 
meet the requirements of temperature limits 
of 2 °C and below. It is based on assumed 
carbon-neutral bioenergy (that is, the same 
amount of CO2 is sequestered at steady state 
by biomass feedstock growth as is released 
during energy generation), combined with 
capture of CO2 produced by combustion 
and its subsequent storage in geological or 
ocean repositories. In other words, BECCS is 
a net transfer of CO2 from the atmosphere, 
through the biosphere, into geological 
layers, providing in addition a non-fossil 
fuel source of energy. Other options include 
afforestation, direct air capture and increases 
in soil carbon storage. Afforestation 
and increased soil carbon storage differ 
from BECCS in that these land-use and 
management changes are associated with 
a saturation of CO2 removal over time, 
and in that the sequestration is reversible 
with terrestrial carbon stocks inherently 
vulnerable to disturbance8.
The need for negative emissions
The IPCC’s Working Group 3 (WG3) 
considered in AR5 over 1,000 emission 
pathways to 2100 (Fig. 1a). Most scenarios 
(101 of 116) leading to concentration levels 
of 430–480 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2eq), 
consistent with limiting warming below 
2 °C, require global net negative emissions 
in the second half of this century, as do 
many scenarios (235 of 653) that reach 
between 480 and 720 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
(Fig. 1b, scenarios below zero). About half 
of the scenarios feature BECCS exceeding 
5% of primary energy supply. Many of those 
(252 of 581) have net positive emissions 
in 2100 (Fig. 1b). Thus, BECCS does not 
ensure net negative emissions (that is, its 
use need not completely offset all positive 
emissions). BECCS is an important 
mitigation technology, especially as the 
stabilization level is lowered, and if near-
term mitigation is delayed. By eventually 
requiring deeper emissions reductions, 
BECCS can help reconcile higher interim 
CO2eq concentrations with low long-term 
stabilization targets, particularly if 
overshooting of concentrations is allowed. 
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Taking into account the full scenario range, 
global net negative emissions would need to 
set in around 2070 for the most challenging 
scenarios and progressively later for higher-
temperature stabilization levels.
IAMs6 and Earth system models (ESMs2) 
provide different but complementary 
approaches for quantifying negative 
emissions requirements. ESMs simulate 
the compatible net CO2 emissions based on 
mass balance between atmospheric changes 
in CO2 and land and ocean carbon sinks. A 
model intercomparison of ten ESMs found 
that two-thirds of the models required net 
negative emissions in the second half of the 
century9, but the ESMs make no assumption 
on how this is technically achieved. For 
IAMs, negative emissions are an outcome of 
an economic optimization driven by a choice 
between reducing emissions and BECCS 
(gross negative emissions). Both approaches 
model the link between CO2 emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations and subsequent 
climate change. Importantly, some of the 
non-CO2 emissions (for example, CH4 and 
N2O from agriculture) will be very difficult 
to mitigate completely, as will some CO2 
emissions from industry and transportation 
below which mitigation will be economically 
and technically very difficult10. Therefore, 
to reach long-term climate stabilization 
under the 2 °C limit, there is likely to be 
a requirement for gross negative CO2 
emissions (that is, at the project level) and 
likely also for net negative emissions (that is, 
the global net balance). 
The challenges ahead
The deployment of large-scale 
bioenergy faces biophysical, technical 
and social challenges11, and CCS is yet 
to be implemented widely. Four major 
uncertainties need to be resolved: (1) the 
physical constraints on BECCS, including 
sustainability of large-scale deployment 
relative to other land and biomass needs, 
such as food security and biodiversity 
conservation, and the presence of safe, long-
term storage capacity for carbon; (2) the 
response of natural land and ocean carbon 
sinks to negative emissions; (3) the costs 
and financing of an untested technology; 
and (4) socio-institutional barriers, such as 
public acceptance of new technologies and 
the related deployment policies. In the IAM 
scenarios in AR56 that are consistent with 
warming of less than 2 °C, the requirement 
for BECCS ranges between 2 and 10 Gt CO2 
annually in 2050, corresponding to 
5–25% of 2010 CO2 emissions and 4–22% 
of baseline 2050 CO2 emissions. Huge 
upscaling efforts will be needed to reach 
this level. In comparison, the current global 
mean removal of CO2 by the ocean and 
terrestrial carbon sinks is 9.2 ± 1.8 Gt CO2 
and 10.3 ± 2.9 Gt CO2, respectively5,12. 
Concerning the capture and storage portion 
of the BECCS chain, the International Energy 
Agency’s CCS roadmap clearly illustrates 
that huge efforts would be needed to achieve 
the scale of CCS (both fossil fuel emissions 
CCS and BECCS) foreseen in current 
stabilization scenarios, as publicly supported 
demonstration programs are still struggling 
to deliver actual large-scale projects13.
It is difficult to estimate the actual costs 
of BECCS, as it is partially in competition 
for resources (land, biomass and storage 
capacity, and cost of CCS) used in other 
mitigation options and for objectives beyond 
climate stabilization. However, while negative 
emissions might seem more expensive than 
established mitigation options, including 
fossil fuel emissions CCS, the mitigation 
pathways to 2100 excluding negative 
emissions technologies are all substantially 
more expensive than the pathways including 
those technologies6,14,15.
Policymakers will need a much more 
complete picture of negative emissions 
than what is currently at hand. Issues of 
governance and behavioural transformations 
need to be better understood. The reliance 
of current scenarios on negative emissions, 
despite very limited knowledge, calls for 
a major new transdisciplinary research 
agenda to (1) examine consistent narratives 
for the potential of implementing and 
managing negative emissions, (2) estimate 
Figure 1 | Carbon dioxide emission pathways until 2100 and the extent of net negative emissions and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) 
in 2100. a, Historical emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industry (black) are primarily from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center4,6. They 
are compared with the IPCC fifth assessment report (AR5) Working Group 3 emissions scenarios (pale colours) and to the four representative concentration 
pathways (RCPs) used to project climate change in the IPCC Working Group 1 contribution to AR5 (dark colours). b, The emission scenarios have been grouped 
into five climate categories5 measured in ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2eq) in 2100 from all components and linked to the most relevant RCP. The temperature 
increase (right of panel a) refers to the warming in the late twenty-first century (2081–2100 average) relative to the 1850–1900 average24. Only scenarios 
assigned to climate categories are shown (1,089 of 1,184). Most scenarios that keep climate warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels use BECCS and 
many require net negative emissions (that is, BECCS exceeding fossil fuel emissions) in 2100. Data sources: IPCC AR5 database, Global Carbon Project and 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.
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uncertainties and feedbacks within the 
socio-institutional, techno-economic and 
Earth system dimensions, and (3) offer 
guidance on how to act under the remaining 
uncertainties. Similarly, technological 
and institutional roadmaps, and rapid 
implementation of pilot projects are needed 
to test feasibility and understand the barriers 
to technological development.
In addition to characterizing the potential 
for negative emissions more reliably and 
geographically explicitly16,17, the tradeoffs 
related with the use of negative emissions 
need to be further assessed. Some recent 
collaborative modelling efforts have provided 
important insights into such potential 
tradeoffs (for example, ref. 18). In the case 
of BECCS, tradeoffs are associated with (1) 
competition for land and possible conflicts 
with the objectives for food security, 
biodiversity conservation and the demand 
for water resources in different sectors (for 
example, ref. 19), and (2) the existence of 
sufficient potential for secure and accessible 
storage of captured CO2 in competition 
with fossil fuel CCS, uncertainties about 
the possibility to upscale negative emissions 
technologies quickly and public acceptance.
A consistent narrative of negative 
emissions management therefore has four 
components (Fig. 2) relating to the key 
uncertainties. The first component refers to 
technological aspects: with BECCS being the 
negative emissions technology most widely 
applied by IAMs, the implied heavy demands 
for sustainable biomass availability are 
suggested to be at least 100 EJ yr−1 and up to 
more than 300 EJ yr−1 of equivalent primary 
energy by 2050 (ref. 20). Also, CO2 storage 
potential in geological layers (aquifers, 
depleted fossil carbon reservoirs) and other 
resources, such as water and fertilizer, in the 
face of increasing food demand will need to 
be addressed. Bioenergy and water recycling 
with solar-powered distillation, algae grown 
offshore and fertilized with previously 
captured CO2, and other innovations are 
among possible technologies enabling 
negative emissions to be achieved with 
lower pressure on land biomass production. 
However, such technologies require significant 
new research and development.
The second component in Fig. 2 describes 
carbon cycle uncertainties and dynamics in 
the Earth system. If negative emissions options 
such as BECCS are used only after significant 
climate change, then the response of the 
global carbon cycle can make the necessary 
amount of negative emissions even larger than 
for a scenario where the future CO2 trajectory 
is contained below 430–480 ppm. This could 
occur through decreasing terrestrial and 
ocean sink efficiencies due to climate change, 
and net releases of CO2 by the land and ocean 
reservoirs due to CO2 removal over several 
decades6,12,21,22.
The third component acknowledges that 
negative emissions will be part of a wider 
mitigation effort and their deployment 
will depend on the cost, risks and timing 
profile of other options. The spectrum 
ranges from more established mitigation 
technologies — for which it might then be 
too late — to solar-radiation management 
geoengineering options, which are quicker 
and cheaper to ramp up, but which 
embody a much larger scale of mostly 
unknown risks23 and are not able to deal 
with other consequences of increased CO2 
concentrations such as ocean acidification. 
This emphasizes that we are not in a position 
to discard the negative emissions option 
easily, despite the above challenges. The fact 
that negative emissions solutions like BECCS 
will require time to achieve sufficient scale 
confirms that the future option space depends 
strongly on today’s decisions.
The final component is concerned with 
institutional and policy challenges. CO2 
removal will be expensive and contentious, 
whereas emissions will remain cheap in the 
absence of strong climate policies. Therefore, 
any CO2 removal strategy requires an 
extraordinary global regulatory framework 
taking into account national economic 
conditions. In the absence of a global climate 
agreement requiring stringent mitigation 
efforts and given the asymmetric distribution 
of mitigation potentials, negative emissions 
could help to offset emissions from countries 
that might not participate in reduction efforts 
or have less capacity to do so. This could 
open new perspectives on global climate 
management. Rigorous monitoring, reporting 
and verification will be needed to facilitate 
these options.
The development of consistent negative 
emissions narratives is not a call for large-
scale BECCS deployment, but a call to 
carefully and quickly assess all dimensions of 
its use for climate stabilization. Determining 
how safe it is to bet on negative emissions 
in the second half of this century to avoid 
dangerous climate change should be among 
our top priorities. ❐
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Figure 2 | The four components of consistent negative emissions narratives.
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COMMENTARY:
Copenhagen II or something new
David G. Victor
For the first time since the failed 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, momentum is building 
towards a new climate agreement. But expectations must be kept in check, and making expert advice 
more useful to the process will require engaging the social sciences more fully. 
Another season of climate diplomacy is under way. In September, the United Nations Secretary General 
will host a summit of world leaders aimed at 
focusing political attention on the need for 
more stringent policies. A few months later, 
in December in Lima, diplomats will take 
stock of their efforts to negotiate a new global 
agreement that would take over before the 
Kyoto Protocol expires in 2020. After Lima, 
a spate of diplomatic events during 2015 will 
culminate at a December summit in Paris, 
when governments are expected to sign the 
new climate accord.
While this surge of diplomacy is promising, 
there are also disturbing parallels with the 
diplomatic run-up to the Copenhagen 
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Will Paris be another Copenhagen? 
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past 12 months the IPCC has released three 
massive new assessments of climate science2–4. 
While important uncertainties will always 
remain, the IPCC’s new assessment — the first 
since 2007 — credibly demonstrates that the 
scientific case for action to cut emissions is 
stronger than ever.
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